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LEATHERS v. MEDLOCK: DIFFERENTIAL
TAXATION OF THE PRESS SURVIVES
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Three provisions in the United States Constitution specifically address
communications. The first provision authorizes Congress to establish post
offices' and the second espouses copyright protections.2 Both of these provi-
sions facilitate the propagation of information through direct government
activism.' The third, guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press,4
seeks similar ends but through different means. Instead of furthering the
spread of knowledge through active intervention, the government promotes
the ideals of the First Amendment by restraining its actions.' Government
intervention in this arena is inimical to the very principles sought to be pro-
tected, those of freedom of speech and of the press, because the institutions
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. This provision enabled the federal government to enter
into the common carrier business. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 17
(1983).
2. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The so-called Copyright Clause gives Congress the
power "To promote the Progress of Science... by securing for limited Times to Authors...
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." Id. This provision represents the Founders'
recognition of intellectual property and their desire to shield it from censorship or mass repro-
duction. POOL, supra note 1, at 16-17.
3. POOL, supra note 1, at 18.
4. The First Amendment to the Constitution provides in pertinent part that "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend.
I. This amendment was a direct rejection, by the newly-formed U.S. government, of several
British attempts to impose restrictive authority over the American press. POOL, supra note 1,
at 16. The term "press" as used in the context of this Note refers to the "institutional press"-
newspapers, magazines, radio, television, and any other member of the mass media that re-
ports the news. See Archibald Cox, Freedom of the Press, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 3, 3.
The distinction between the dual guarantees of "speech" and "press" has long been a subject
of debate among legal scholars. Compare Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J.
631 (1975) (stating that it is a constitutional redundancy if the free press guarantee means no
more than the freedom of expression, and suggesting that it is this unifying principle that
underlies the Supreme Court's ideology when deciding First Amendment cases dealing with
the organized press) with Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press A Redun-
dancy: What Does it Add To Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975) (pointing out
the many instances where the Supreme Court failed to discern or articulate a distinction be-
tween the freedoms of speech and the press when a distinction of that sort was possible).
5. POOL, supra note 1, at 18; see also GILES J. PATrERSON, FREE SPEECH AND A FREE
PRESS (1939).
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that are founded on these principles often serve as important restraints on
government.6
Both state and federal governments have successfully pierced the veil of
constitutionally-imposed First Amendment protections by using their power
to levy and collect taxes. Regarding the press, these taxes generally take the
form of sales and use taxes.7 While it is not uncommon for a state to grant a
specific tax exemption to certain members of the press, thus mitigating po-
tential First Amendment conflicts, 8 even those exemptions are subject to the
principles of the Free Press Clause.9 Recognizing that First Amendment
tensions continue to exist as states impose new taxes and exemptions on the
press, the Supreme Court has established the standard that the burden im-
posed by a particular piece of tax legislation on the press must be necessary
to serve a "compelling" or "overriding" governmental interest in order to be
held constitutional.'O
Before this "strict scrutiny" standard is applied, however, the Court first
requires proof that the tax has in fact substantially burdened the press."
The Supreme Court has never suggested that the press is immune from the
general forms of taxation necessary to sustain the operations of the govern-
ment. 2 Instead, it has identified four specific factors which, if present in a
6. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 634.
7. See generally JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 418-95 (1969) (discussing the nature and development of sales and use taxation);
PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 577-638
(1981 & Supp. 1990) (discussing the development and implications of sales and use taxation).
8. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (exempting
newspapers and certain magazines from a state sales tax); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (exempting newspapers from the first
$100,000 spent by publishers on an ink and paper use tax).
9. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592 (holding that the tax scheme was unconsti-
tutional because the combined effect of the tax and exemption on the press was discrimina-
tory); Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 233 (same).
10. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 582. This standard is generally referred to as the "strict
scrutiny" standard. The Supreme Court has applied this standard in several different types of
cases involving infringements upon First Amendment freedoms. See generally Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (stating that a compelling governmental interest must jus-
tify the burden on the Free Exercise Clause of a disallowance of a federal income tax deduction
for certain payments to a religious organization); Arkansas Writers, 481 U.S. at 221 (stating
that differential taxation of the press within the same medium may only be justified by a com-
pelling governmental interest); United States v.. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (stating that the
imposition of social security taxes upon a member of the Amish faith may be a justifiable
limitation on religious liberty if it meets the strict scrutiny standard).
11. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 582-83. While any tax is a burden, the Court has "long
upheld economic regulation of the press." Id. at 583.
12. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). Generally applicable tax
legislation normally does not unconstitutionally infringe upon rights guaranteed under the
First Amendment. See University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 200 (1990) (noting
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state's tax scheme, raise the presumption of unconstitutionality because of
the substantial burden placed upon the press. 3 This two-prong analysis-
identification of the discrimination and application of the strict scrutiny
standard-has become the test to quash unconstitutional means of abridging
the freedom of the press through discriminatory tax treatment.
The nondiscrimination principle provides that discriminatory tax treat-
ment of the press is presumptively unconstitutional unless the state proves it
has a compelling governmental interest. 4 Whether a particular tax scheme
is discriminatory is determined by distinguishing between a generally appli-
cable tax and a "differential" or "selective" tax." Differential taxation of
the press is generally defined as taxing members of the media in a manner
different than that customarily accorded non-media businesses.' 6 It is pre-
sumed that evidence of differential taxation of the press is violative of the
nondiscrimination principle and that such taxation is thus an unconstitu-
tional interference with the press as an institution protected by the First
Amendment.' 7 If properly employed, the nondiscrimination principle, ex-
emplified by the two-prong analysis, maintains an equitable balance between
a government's privilege to tax and the press' guaranteed freedoms under the
Free Press Clause.
The nondiscrimination principle has enjoyed most of its development in
our legal system within the last six decades.' Leathers v. Medlock '9 is the
most recent Supreme Court decision examining this doctrine. The Leathers
that a university can be subjected to a generally applicable tax without violating its First
Amendment right to academic freedom); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization,
493 U.S. 378, 393, 397 (1990) (holding that the imposition of a six-percent sales and use tax
upon a religious organization's distribution of religious materials does not violate the First
Amendment); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972) (noting that the First Amend-
ment is not violated by nondiscriminatory forms of general taxation upon the press).
13. See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250-51 (identifying illicit legislative intent and "targeting" as
unconstitutional types of tax discrimination on the press); Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 583
(identifying special taxes applicable to the press alone as unconstitutional types of tax discrimi-
nation on the press); Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 231 (identifying content-based regulation
as an unconstitutional type of tax discrimination on the press). Evidence of any of these four
types of discrimination raises a presumption of unconstitutionality in a tax scheme unless the
state satisfies a strict scrutiny review. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
14. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 582, 585.
15. Id. at 582-85.
16. Jerry R. Parkinson, Note, Minneapolis Star Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner
of Revenue: Differential Taxation of the Press Violates the First Amendmant, 16 IOWA L. REV.
1103, 1106.
17. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585.
18. The first case to deal directly with this issue was decided in 1936. See Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
19. 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991). Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, which
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Sou-
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Court addressed the claim of a group of cable television operators who ar-
gued that a State's sales and use tax violated the operators' First Amend-
ment right to freedom of the press.2" Prior to Leathers, the Supreme Court
decided three cases that set out to define the scope of differential taxation as
it applies to the press.2 Through these cases, the Court articulated the ex-
tent to which taxes that are selectively applied to different members within
the same medium are permissible under the First Amendment. 22
First in Grosjean v. American Press Co.,23 the Court struck down a license
tax based on a newspaper's circulation because it was a deliberate attempt to
limit the circulation of information by placing a tax upon a select group of
newspaper publications.24 In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Commissioner of Revenue,25 the Court held a special use tax on ink and pa-
per to be an impermissible violation of freedom of the press not only because
it targeted a small group of newspapers, but also because it singled out the
press as an institution for differential treatment. 26 This result was reaffirmed
four years later in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,27 where the
Court invalidated a sales tax that selectively targeted one particular group of
magazines by exempting other classes of magazines based solely upon their
content.28
ter. Id. at 1440. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justice Black-
mun. Id. at 1447.
20. Id. at 1441. Not only is the federal government prohibited from regulating the press
under the First Amendment, but the states have also been subject to this restriction under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, which was held to
have extended the First Amendment restrictions to the states in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925).
21. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 233 (1987) (holding the
selective application of the state's sales tax to only certain magazines unconstitutional); Minne-
apolis Star, 460 U.S. at 591-93 (holding a special tax on the use of ink and paper unconstitu-
tional); Grosean, 297 U.S. at 250 (holding a license tax based on a publication's advertising
and circulation unconstitutional).
22. The license tax in Grosjean burdened only those newspapers with a circulation over
20,000, and not those newspapers with a circulation of less than 20,000. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at
244-45. The Minnesota ink and paper tax burdened only those newspapers outside of a
$100,000 exemption. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 591. The Arkansas sales tax was applied
to only a select group of magazines. Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 233. Though the issue was
raised in Arkansas Writers' that the tax was also discriminatory because it exempted all news-
papers but only some magazines, the Court did not decide that issue because it found the tax
unconstitutional for distinguishing between different members of the same medium of
magazines. Id. at 232-33.
23. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
24. Id. at 251.
25. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
26. Id. at 591.
27. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
28. Id. at 233.
[Vol. 41:507
Leathers v. Medlock
At the time the Arkansas Writers' case was decided in 1987, the Supreme
Court had identified four types of discrimination which would satisfy the
first prong of its analysis: illicit legislative intent, targeting, special taxation,
and content-based regulation.29 Once the significant discriminatory burden
was identified, then the tax scheme would be struck down under the nondis-
crimination principle unless there was a compelling interest asserted by the
State under the second prong of the Court's analysis.3° Prior to Leathers,
the Court applied this principle in two contexts. First, it held that the prin-
ciple prohibited tax legislation that imposed burdens on the press not borne
by similar nonmedia organizations.31 Second, the Court recognized that the
principle prohibited tax legislation that discriminated among individual
members of the same medium. 2
In Leathers, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a gener-
ally applicable tax that was evenly applied to one member of the press, as
opposed to its earlier considerations of taxes applied selectively within one
medium. 33 Cable television was singled out of the press industry and sub-
jected to Arkansas' general sales and use tax in a 1987 amendment to the
Arkansas Gross Receipts Act (AGRA).34 Representatives of the Arkansas
29. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 10.
31. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591
(1983).
32. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 251 (1983); Minneapolis Star, 460
U.S. at 591-92; Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
33. 111 S. Ct. at 1442. More specifically, the Court ruled on the legitimacy of a state's
extension of its general sales tax to one member of the press, cable television, while exempting
other members of the media such as newspapers, magazines, and temporarily direct broadcast
satellite services. Id. at 1441. The Arkansas sales tax was not applied to the "like-situated"
media institution of direct broadcast satellite services, nor was it applied to such "dissimilar"
media institutions as newspapers or certain magazines. Id.
34. Id. at 1441. The Arkansas Gross Receipts Act (AGRA) imposes a 4% excise tax on
the gross proceeds for sales of all tangible personal property and of several specified services.
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-52-301, 26-52-302 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991). An additional 1%
tax is levied by the counties within Arkansas, while cities may impose a further one-half or 1%
tax on those same goods and services subject to taxation under AGRA. Id. §§ 26-74-307, 26-
74-222 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991). AGRA expressly exempts various products and services
from the sales tax, including newspapers and "[r]eligious, professional, trade, and sports jour-
nals and publications printed and published within this state and sold through regular sub-
scriptions." Id. § 26-52-401(4), (14) (Supp. 1991).
Prior to 1987, neither cable television nor scrambled satellite broadcast television were listed
among those services subject to the 4% sales tax under AGRA. See id. § 26-52-301 (Michie
1987). These services were also not listed among the items specifically exempted from the tax.
See id. § 26-52-401. In 1987, Arkansas added Cable television services provided to subscribers
or users to the list of services subject to the sales tax. Act of Mar. 12, 1987 Ark. Acts No. 188,
§ 1(4) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-301(3)(D)(i) (Supp. 1991)). It defined these serv-
ices as "includ[ing] all service charges and rental charges whether for basic service or premium
19921
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cable industry filed a class action suit in an Arkansas chancery court, con-
tending that the extension of the tax to cable services alone violated the First
Amendment's Free Press Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause.35 The trial court upheld the tax extension.36 The Ar-
kansas state legislature subsequently extended the tax to include comparable
direct broadcast satellite services, while maintaining the exemption for news-
papers and certain magazines.37
Two issues involving differential taxation and the press arose in Leathers
that had yet to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. First, during one period,
cable services were taxed after the passage of Act 769 while direct broadcast
satellite services that were deemed "substantially the same" were not
taxed.38 This raised the issue of whether it was permissible to tax like-situ-
ated media differently.39 In addition, both cable and direct broadcast satel-
lite services were taxed after the passage of Act 769 while members of the
print media were specifically exempted. Thus, there was a second issue of
whether it was permissible to differentially tax similar members of the media
over other distinctly different members of the media.'
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the chancery court's
holding and ruled that the tax was unconstitutional for the period during
which it applied to cable services alone.4 The state court held, however,
that the tax was valid after it was extended by Act 769 to include direct
channels or other special service, and shall include installation and repair service charges and
any other charges having any connection with the providing of cable television services." Id.
In 1989, two years after the adoption of Act 188 extending the sales tax to cable services,
Arkansas adopted Act 769 which extended the sales tax, to include:
Service of cable television, community antenna television, and any and all other
distribution of television, video, or radio services with or without the use of wires
provided to subscribers or paying customers or users, including all service charges
and rental charges, whether for basic service, premium channels, or other special
service, and including installation and repair service charges and any other charges
having any connection with the providing of the said services.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-301(3)(D)(i) (Supp. 1991).
35. Medlock v. Pledger, 785 S.W.2d 202, 203 (Ark. 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 111
S. Ct. 1438 (1991). The taxpayers also sought protection under the First Amendment's Free
Speech Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Supremacy Clause. Id.
36. Id. The chancellor ruled that Act 188 did not unconstitutionally discriminate against
cable television. Noting that cable televison is a unique medium because it requires the use of
public property, the chancellor found it distinguishable from other types of media. Id.
37. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. This period was from the enactment of the
Act 188 in 1987 to the enactment of Act 769 in 1989. Medlock, 785 S.W.2d at 203.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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broadcast satellite services.42 The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to review these issues.43
The Court held that the tax was constitutional as applied to cable services
alone or to both cable and similar services together even though it exempted
all other members of the press.' The majority saw no need to find a com-
pelling justification for the tax scheme because it determined that the tax as
applied to the press was free from any of the difficulties it had identified as
discriminatory in the past.4" This decision was based upon First Amend-
ment grounds, and the Court remanded the case in order to allow the parties
to develop arguments on the equal protection issue.46
42. Id. The court found no Supreme Court holding stating that the First Amendment
would be violated by the failure to tax one member of the press (e.g., newspapers) in the same
manner as another (e.g., radio broadcasts). Id. The court reasoned that "[i]t would be impos-
sible to impose a tax which would have the same effect on broadcast television, the delivery of
which produces no direct 'gross proceeds,' and cable television." Id.
43. Pledger v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
44. Leathers v. Medlock, Ill S. Ct. 1438, 1447 (1991).
45. Id. at 1444.
46. Id. The Supreme Court of Arkansas permitted the appellants to brief the equal pro-
tection issue, as mandated by the Supreme Court, as well as the issue concerning federal legis-
lation and the Supremacy Clause which was raised but not considered in the first appeal.
Medlock v. Pledger, 809 S.W.2d 822 (Ark. 1991).
The Supreme Court of Arkansas delivered an opinion upon a similar set of issues just two
months after the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the equal protection issue in Leathers. Bos-
worth v. Pledger, 810 S.W.2d 918 (Ark.), cert. denied, Bosworth v. Leathers, 112 S. Ct. 617
(1991). In Bosworth, the court considered the constitutionality of the 1987 Arkansas enact-
ment of Act 27, which had extended the state sales tax to include all "regular" long distance
telecommunications services while exempting both private line and wide-area telecommunica-
tions services (WATS). Id. at 919. Telephone subscribers subject to the tax claimed that Act
27 violated the equal protection provisions of both the Arkansas and U.S. Constitutions. Id. at
920. Appellants also argued that the court should apply a higher "strict scrutiny" standard of
review instead of the minimum "rational basis" analysis traditionally applied to a state's taxa-
tion powers because the Act abridged their guaranteed rights under the First Amendment. Id.
at 921.
The court did not agree. Id. at 922. It found no evidence of the types of discrimination that
invalidated the tax schemes in Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers'. Id. In fact, the court
reasoned that the tax scheme was analogous to that in Leathers because it did not "threaten to
suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints .... target a small group of speakers
or discriminate on the basis of the content of taxpayers' speech." Id. Therefore, because Act
27 did not violate First Amendment rights, the court held that the stricter standard of review
was inapplicable. Id. In applying the "rational basis" analysis-the test customarily em-
ployed in an equal protection examination-the court upheld the tax scheme because it hy-
pothesized a "legitimate governmental purpose" for which the state could impose its
classification scheme upon long distance telephone services. Id. at 923. The Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari in this case is a strong indication that the Leathers v. Medlock equal protec-
tion issue now before the Arkansas Supreme Court on remand will be analyzed in a similar
fashion and the tax ultimately upheld by the Arkansas Supreme Court as constitutional on all
grounds.
19921
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The dissent in Leathers stated that the majority ignored precedent that
clearly justified the extension of the nondiscrimination principle to include
prohibiting a state from burdening one particular information medium with
a tax not borne by other media.4 7 Recognizing that the central concern un-
derlying the need for a strong nondiscrimination principle is to prevent cov-
ert censorship of the press, Justice Marshall admonished the majority for
abandoning an established principle explicitly designed to thwart the poten-
tially abusive effects of differential tax treatment of the press. 4' Both the
majority and dissent acknowledged that the press could not be singled out
for taxation absent a compelling justification by a state legislature.49 While
the majority found the tax nondiscriminatory and the need for the State to
show a compelling justification unnecessary, the dissent found several rea-
sons why the tax scheme violated the First Amendment's Free Press
Clause.' ° The dissent concluded that there was no compelling justification
in the State's assertion that the differential tax treatment was required to
raise revenue.51
This Note analyzes the United States Supreme Court's decision on differ-
ential taxation and the press in Leathers v. Medlock. It first examines the
historical basis of the Court's concern in instances where a legislature seeks
to impose burdensome taxes on the press. It then traces the development of
the nondiscrimination principle and the Court's application of this doctrine
in the three main cases that set the stage for the Court's holding in Leathers.
This Note then analyzes the Leathers opinion in light of precedent and dis-
cusses its impact on the nondiscrimination principle. Finally, this Note con-
cludes that the Supreme Court's new restrictive reading of the
nondiscrimination principle continues to preclude government infringement
of the rights guaranteed the press under the First Amendment while more
effectively allowing for equitable and efficient taxation schemes via a certain
degree of differential taxation of the press.
47. Leathers, 11l S. Ct. at 1448 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun joined in this
opinion.
48. Id. at 1449.
49. Id. at 1443.
50. Id. at 1450.
51. Id.
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE
A. Evolution of the Free Press Clause
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that
Congress shall not pass any law that abridges the freedom of the press 52
Since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,5 3 the free press guar-
anty is also binding upon state legislatures.54 A major catalyst behind the
adoption of the First Amendment was the Framers' concern over England's
"taxes on knowledge."55 Initially, both the church and the state in England
closely supervised and censored dissenting views, and this intensified with
the introduction of the printing press in 1476.56 When Henry VIII denied
the authority of the Pope, over the Church of England and bestowed it upon
himself, the Crown took over most of the responsibility in restraining the
press.57 In his desire to regain full control of printing, Henry enacted the
Proclamation of 1538 to establish a censorship system through state licens-
ing of all books printed in English.58
The insufficiency of the Proclamation in curtailing criticism led to the en-
actment of the Star Chamber Decree in 1586, a comprehensive system of
government licensing of the press which restricted the right to print, the
location of the print shops, and the total number of presses permitted
throughout the country.59 Following the demise of the Star Chamber in
1641, Parliament, when it took power from the Crown, attempted to control
printing by stricter licensing of the press, 6° prosecution of critics for criminal
52. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. In full, the First Amendment states that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In relevant part, the section states that "[n]o State
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
54. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
55. Eric Neisser, Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Marketplace of
Ideas, 74 GEO. L.J. 257, 264-68 (1985). These taxes were imposed by the English Parliament
upon all newspapers and advertisements in order to suppress the publication of comments and
criticisms objectionable to the Crown. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 246
(1936).
56. PATTERSON, supra note 5, at 27. The Church took the initial lead by outlawing
books, and later by burning books and their authors as well. Neisser, supra note 55, at 261.
57. PATTERSON, supra note 5, at 27; Neisser, supra note 55, at 261.
58. Neisser, supra note 55, at 261.
59. POOL, supra note 1, at 15.
60. Id. at 15. The government was given complete control over printing by Parliament's
enactment of the Licensing Act in 1662. Neisser, supra note 55, at 262. The Licensing Act,
repeatedly renewed until 1695, authorized severe punishments for anyone publishing any ma-
terial without first obtaining a government license. Id In his classic argument on censorship,
John Milton rigorously criticized the Licensing Act and challenged those who imposed it:
1992]
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libel, 6 ' and differential taxation of the press. 62 The primary means of taxa-
tion was the Stamp Act, which imposed duties on paper, on all advertise-
ments in a newspaper, and on newspapers themselves.63 Each of these three
controls was systematically abolished by the legislature and judiciary in the
United States.64 Indeed, it was Parliament's attempt in 1765 to levy the
stamp tax on the American colonies that precipitated the incorporation of an
express guarantee of freedom of the press in the Constitution.65
B. Grosjean v. American Press Co.: A Foundation is Established
In 1936 the Supreme Court heard its first challenge to the constitutional-
ity of a tax imposed upon the press.6 6 Nine Louisiana newspaper publishers
brought an action to enjoin the enforcement of a state law imposing a two
percent license tax upon the gross receipts of advertising in any publication
What should ye do then, should ye suppress all this flowery crop of knowledge and
new light sprung up and yet springing daily in this city, should ye set an oligarchy of
twenty ingrossers over it, to bring famine upon our minds again, when we shall know
nothing but what is measured to us by their bushel? Believe it, Lords and Commons,
they who counsel ye to such a suppressing, do as good as bid ye suppress your-
selves .... If it be desired to know the immediate cause of all this free writing and
free speaking, there can not be assigned a truer than your own mild, and free, and
human government: it is liberty ... which hath rarified and enlightened our spirits
like the influence of heaven.
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1643) (footnote omitted).
61. POOL, supra note 1, at 16. English citizens who published criminal materials were
prosecuted not by injured private citizens but by the State itself for the crime of libel against
authority. Id.
62. Id. at 15. Once the Licensing Act was repealed by Parliament, taxation of the press
became the principal means by which to control the press. Id.
63. Id. Parliament passed the Stamp Act in response to Queen Anne's plea to Parliament
in 1712 that it find some remedy with which to squelch the scandalous libels being published
against the government. Neisser, supra note 55, at 263. The stamp taxes were a popular de-
vice for suppressing criticisms objectionable to the government. Id. They were intended to
curtail the circulation of newspapers and thus the acquisition of knowledge rather than for
purpose of revenue raising. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247 (1936). In
particular, the stamp taxes were aimed at silencing the cheaper newspapers that were most
favored among the general populace. Id. at 246.
64. POOL, supra note 1, at 16; Neisser, supra note 55, at 263-64. These three restrictions
to a free press were rejected by American legislatures and courts as they found their way into
our legal system. POOL, supra note 1, at 16. The unconstitutionality of licensing of the press,
also referred to as "prior restraint," was decided as early as 1825. Id.; see Commonwealth v.
Blanding, 3 Pick 304, 15 Am. Dec. 214. The prohibition of criminal libel suits became law
with the 1735 acquittal of Peter Zenger, accused of libeling the Governor of New York. Id.
Since 1964, libel suits brought by public officials or public figures have been greatly restricted
by the courts. Id.; see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Supreme Court
rejected special taxes on the press, or "taxes on knowledge," in a 1936 case reviewing a licens-
ing tax on publications. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
65. PATTERSON, supra note 5, at 123-29; see also Stewart, supra note 4.
66. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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with a circulation greater than 20,000 copies per week.67 Of the 120 newspa-
pers in the state, the only ones subjected to the tax were the thirteen newspa-
pers published by the plaintiffs.6" There was strong evidence that the tax
was an apparent attempt to penalize the larger newspapers for opposing cer-
tain Louisiana politicians.6 9 The statute was challenged as a violation of the
Free Press Clause and as a denial of equal protection as required of the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment.70
In Grosjean v. American Press Co., the Supreme Court invalidated the
Louisiana tax because it abridged the freedom of the press as guaranteed by
the First Amendment. 71 The Court based its holding on three grounds.
First, after analyzing the impact of the tax on the press, the Court concluded
that it not only curtailed advertising revenues but also restricted the circula-
tion of certain publications. 2 Second, the Court likened Louisiana's license
tax to the odious stamp taxes,7a and held it to be a "deliberate" attempt by
the legislature to impede the flow of information to the general public.74
67. Id. at 240. More specifically, the statutory provision required:
That every person, firm, association, or corporation, domestic or foreign, engaged in
the business of selling, or making any charge for, advertising or for advertisements,
whether printed or published, or to be printed or published, in any newspaper, maga-
zine, periodical or publication whatever having a circulation of more than 20,000
copies per week... in the State of Louisiana, shall, in addition to all other taxes and
licenses levied and assessed in this State, pay a license tax for the privilege of engag-
ing in such business in this State of two per cent. (2%) of the gross receipts of such
business.
Act No. 23, July 12, 1934.
68. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 241.
69. Id. at 238. A note bearing the signatures of Senator Huey P. Long and Louisiana
Governor Oscar Allen that was circulated among members of the legislature prior to final
passage of the tax bill provided strong evidence that the tax was in fact a retaliatory measure:
The lying newspapers are continuing a vicious campaign against giving the people a
free right to vote. We managed to take care of that element here last week. A tax of
2 per cent on what newspapers take in was placed upon them. That will help their
lying some. Up to this time they have never paid any license to do business like
everyone else does. It is a system these big Louisiana newspapers tell a lie every time
they make a dollar. This tax should be called a tax on lying, 2 cents a lie.
J. GERALD, THE PRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1931-1947 100-01 (1948).
70. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 242-43.
71. Id. at 251. The Court found it unnecessary to find further grounds for invalidating
the tax under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
72. 297 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1936).
73. See generally id. at 245-49 (reviewing the history of the Stamp Act and its effect on
American jurisprudence).
74. Id. at 250; see supra note 69 and accompanying text. It is difficult to discern from the
Court's opinion the extent to which it relied upon the improper motives of the legislature in
passing this law. Leila Sadat-Keeling, Note, Constitutional Law - Supreme Court Finds First
Amendment A Barrier to Taxation of the Press, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1073, 1075 (1984). The Court
referred to illicit intent when it described the tax as "bad because, in the light of its history and
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Lastly, the Court asserted that the form of the tax was "suspicious" because
its basis on circulation tended to target a "selected group of newspapers.""
Although the Court did not invoke or develop any particular test for future
cases, it endorsed the principle that any action by the government that im-
peded the flow of information to the public was a potential "evil" to the
freedom of the press.76 The Court carefully pointed out, however, that re-
gardless of this principle, newspapers were not immune from the "ordinary
forms of taxation" necessary to support the government.77
The Court reasoned that the meaning of "freedom of the press" was not
restricted to the narrow view of merely "immunity from previous censor-
ship."78 The Court argued in broader terms that it was meant to preclude
"any form of previous restraint" upon the press.7 9 It was upon this broader
premise that the Court invalidated the Louisiana license tax as one "single in
kind" because of its invidious nature of being applicable only to advertise-
ments in publications with circulations greater than 20,000.80 The Court
recognized that any action by the government which might prevent a free
and open public forum for the exchange of ideas was an invitation for special
concern on the part of the courts.'
of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to
limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional
guarantees." Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250 (emphasis added).
The Court also declared that the tax had "the plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and
curtailing the circulation of a selected group of newspapers." Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
The Court's failure to elaborate more directly on the legislative history behind the enactment
of this tax, coupled with its lengthy discourse in the opinion on the history behind the First
Amendment, suggests that the decision is based on broader First Amendment principles.
Sadat-Keeling, supra, at 1075.
Subsequent cases have not been consistent in their reading of Grosjean on the relevance of
illicit legislative purpose. Compare United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-85 (1968) (stat-
ing that legislative purpose was irrelevant to the outcome in Grosean) with Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1978) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that the purpose was
relevant in Gros/ean). The issue on the relevance of illicit legislative intent was finally resolved
in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
75. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 251.
76. Id. at 249-50.
77. Id. at 250. The Court distinguished the Louisiana tax as "one single in kind, with a
long history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the press." Id.
78. Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 250.
81. Id.
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C. Minneapolis Star: Developing A Reliable Analysis
In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Reve-
nue, 2 the Supreme Court again confronted the scope of permissible taxation
of the press. s3 In 1967, the Minnesota legislature established a system of
sales and use taxes 4 that included an exemption for newspapers from the
sales tax and from the use tax for the ink and paper used in publication
production.8 5 The exemption of ink and paper from the use tax was elimi-
nated in 1971,86 but was subsequently amended in 1973 to exempt the first
$100,000 of ink and paper consumed each year in the production of a publi-
82. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
83. Following Grosjean, two courts invalidated tax statutes that were unconstitutionally
burdensome upon the freedom of the press. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 314 N.W.2d 201, 206 (Minn. 1981). First, a Florida court struck down a
business license tax which increased dramatically with circulation, concluding that Grosjean
invalidated any license tax "based on volume of circulation and graduated by scale." City of
Tampa v. Tampa Times Co., 15 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. 1943). Second, a Maryland court invali-
dated Baltimore municipal taxes imposed upon buyers of advertising in newspapers, radio, and
television. City of Baltimore v. A. S. Abell Co., 145 A.2d 111, 119 (Md. 1958).
Taxes on the press upheld in the wake of Grosjean included a privilege tax on the gross
proceeds of sales or gross income of the business of publishing newspapers, periodicals, and
other publications, the court ultimately finding that the tax was part of the general sales tax
without hostility to the press. Giragi v. Moore, 64 P.2d 819, 821 (Ariz.), appeal dismissed, 301
U.S. 670 (1937). A tax that was part of general revenue measures imposed upon all advertis-
ers, including newspapers, was also upheld. Lee Enters., Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 162
N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1968); accord Territory of Alaska v. Journal Printing Co., 135 F. Supp. 169
(D. Alaska 1955) (upholding business license tax on printing shops and publishers of newspa-
pers); City of Corona v. Corona Daily Indep., 252 P.2d 56 (Cal. 1953) (upholding nominal
annual business license tax); Donnelly Corp. v. City of Bellevue, 140 S.W.2d 1024 (Ky. 1940)
(sustaining occupational license tax); Steinbeck v. Gerosa, 151 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y.) (sustaining
general gross receipts tax), appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 39 (1958).
During the time between Grosjean and Minneapolis Star, the Supreme Court was involved in
roughly three lines of cases relating to First Amendment issues and the press. Sadat-Keeling,
supra note 74, at 1076-77. The Court found in one category of cases that press freedoms were
not constitutionally abridged by generally applicable federal economic regulations such as the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act or the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 1077 nn.21-24. In the
second category of cases, involving the taxation of individuals as opposed to the institutional
press, the Court consistently held that ordinances imposing licensing requirements on individ-
uals exercising First Amendment freedoms were unconstitutional. Id. at 1078 n.25. Finally,
in the third group of cases, the Court explored the First Amendment limits on government
regulation of the press. Id. at 1079-80.
84. Act of June 1, 1967, ch. 32, art. XIII, 1967 Minn. Laws Spec. Sess. 2143, 2177 (codi-
fied as amended at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.01-.44 (West 1991)). For background sources
on sales and use taxes, see supra note 7.
85. Id. § 25(l)(i), 1967 Minn. Laws Spec. Sess. 2143, 2186 (codified as amended at MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 297A.14, .25(i)(West 1991)).
86. Act of Oct. 30, 1971, ch. 31, art. I § 5(l)(i), 1971 Minn. Laws Spec. Sess. 2561, 2565
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 297A.14, .25(i) (West 1991)).
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cation.8 7 Star Tribune was one of eleven publishers, together producing
fourteen of the 388 circulation newspapers within the State that incurred a
tax liability in the first year. Star Tribune alone paid out over two-thirds of
the total revenue raised by the tax.88 The numbers were roughly the same
the following year.89 Star Tribune contended that the use tax on ink and
paper violated interests protected by the First Amendment's Free Press
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.90
Star Tribune urged the Court to summarily invalidate the use tax on ink
and paper based upon the precedent set in Grosjean.9 ' The Court distin-
guished Grosjean, however, because in that case the legislature's intent to
willfully penalize a small group of newspapers was in part attributable to the
tax being defeated.92 In Minneapolis Star, there was no evidence of a censo-
rial motive from the legislature. The Court, therefore, resolved itself to as-
certain whether a state's enactment of a special tax on the press violated
general First Amendment principles.93 In reaching the conclusion that the
Minnesota use tax violated the First Amendment's Free Press Clause, the
Court also settled Grosjean's legislative intent controversy by explicitly stat-
87. Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 650, art. XIII, § 1, 1973 Minn. Laws 1606, 1637 (codified at
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.14 (West 1991)). After the amendment, the use provision read in
relevant part:
For the privilege of using, storing or consuming in Minnesota tangible personal prop-
erty.... there is hereby imposed on every person in this State a use tax at the rate of
four percent of the sales price of sales at retail of any of the aforementioned items
.... Notwithstanding any other provisions of section 297A.01 to 297A.44 to the
contrary, the cost of ink and paper products exceeding $100,000 in any calendar
year, used or consumed in producing a publication.., is subject to the tax imposed
by this section.
Id. The $100,000 exemption amounted to a $4,000 tax credit to newspapers and other publish-
ers. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 314 N.W.2d 201, 203
(Minn. 1981).
88. Minneapolis Star, 314 N.W.2d at 203-04 n.4. Of the $893,355 collected by the state in
1974, Star Tribune paid $608,634. Id.
89. Id. Thirteen publishers, producing 16 of 374 circulation newspapers, incurred a tax in
1975. Id. at 204 n.5. Star Tribune paid $636,113, again over two-thirds of the total $944,055
collected by the State. Id.
90. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 579
(1983).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 580.
93. Id. See Randall P. Bezanson, Political Agnosticism, Editorial Freedom, and Govern-
ment Neutrality Toward the Press: Observations on Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minne-
sota Commissioner of Revenue, 72 IowA L. REV. 1359 (1987) (outlining the principle of
neutrality that underlies Minneapolis Star, and harmonizing that principle with prior decisions
resting on the free press guarantee and with the historical origins of freedom of the press).
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ing that illicit motive is not an indispensable condition to assert a violation of
the First Amendment.94
The Minneapolis Star Court reached its conclusion by employing a two-
prong analysis. First, the Court determined that the tax provision was
"facially discriminatory. '" The Court reasoned that the state, instead of
applying its general sales and use tax to newspapers, created a special tax
scheme that singled out certain publications.96 The Court then contended
that this "differential" treatment of the press placed such a burden on rights
guaranteed by the Free Press Clause that the tax scheme would be upheld
only if the State asserted a "counterbalancing interest of compelling impor-
tance" that it could not attain without differential treatment.97 The Court
held that special treatment of the press was not justified by Minnesota's in-
terest in generating revenue because the State could have realized the same
result by taxing businesses generally, and thus avoided singling out the
press.98
Additionally, the Court found the tax on the press discriminatory because
it "targeted" a small group of newspapers.99 The Court did not find compel-
ling Minnesota's claim that the treatment was an equitable means by which
"to give favorable tax treatment to smaller enterprises. ''" °" Justice White,
concurring, found that this "target" criterion alone would have been suffi-
cient grounds for striking down the Minnesota tax. 10 He contended that
the Court needlessly tackled the issue of whether a state may impose a use
94. Id. at 591-92; see supra notes 69, 74 and accompanying text.
95. Id. at 581.
96. Id. The Court was skeptical of Minnesota's "unique" use tax for two reasons. First,
unlike an ordinary use tax, the Minnesota tax did not serve a complementary function to the
sales tax. Id. at 581. Second, Minnesota taxed the intermediate transaction of ink and paper
purchases rather than the finished products purchased by the ultimate user. Id. at 581-82.
97. Id. at 585.
98. Id. at 586.
99. Id. at 591.
100. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 314 N.W.2d 201,
209 (Minn. 1981). The Court found the State's pronouncement that it was favoring an "equi-
table" tax system uncompelling because "there are no comparable exemptions for small enter-
prises outside the press." Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 591 (emphasis added); see also Jerry R.
Parkinson, Note, Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue:
Differential Taxation of the Press Violates the First Amendment, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1103, 1113-
14 (1984) (stating that Minnesota's position was seriously undermined by the absence of any
other evidence indicating the importance of the State's professed policy of an equitable tax
scheme); cf Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178, 183, 184 (1946) (holding that
the exemption of small weekly and semi-weekly newspapers from the Fair Labor Standards
Act was constitutional where the State's motive was "to put those papers more on a parity
with other small town enterprises").
101. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 593 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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tax that applied even-handedly to all publishers.12 He disagreed with the
majority's assertion that the Court was "poorly equipped" to weigh the rela-
tive burdens of particular tax schemes with any precision.' °3 Justice White
maintained that the Court frequently evaluated the burdensome effects of a
tax on a particular entity.' 4 In agreeing with Justice Rehnquist's theory
that a differential tax could actually benefit the press,'" 5 Justice White de-
parted from the majority's belief that the First Amendment barred a state
from choosing one method of taxation over another. 106
Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent that differential treatment of newspa-
pers in Minnesota's sales and use tax scheme did not, in and of itself, uncon-
stitutionally infringe upon First Amendment freedoms.' °7 Thus, a strict
scrutiny review was unnecessary.'08 Justice Rehnquist demonstrated, using
a relatively simple mathematical analysis, that the special Minnesota use tax
vis-d-vis the generally applicable sales tax was significantly less burdensome
to Star Tribune."o He reasoned that if there was no "infringement" of First
Amendment rights, then there was no "abridgement" of those rights as for-
bidden by the First Amendment." 0
Justice Rehnquist defined "infringement" as a significant burden on a spe-
cially protected right."' He reasoned that because the Minnesota use tax
102. Id. The Minnesota State Supreme Court addressed the issue of "whether the State of
Minnesota may . . . impose a use tax on consumption of ink and paper which, due to an
exemption in the law, is paid by some newspapers and publications but not by all." Minneapolis
Star, 314 N.W.2d at 202 (emphasis added). It is evident that this was Star Tribune's primary
concern because it only challenged the tax in 1974 after the $100,000 exemption provision was
enacted. Id. at 203. Star Tribune did not challenge the fact that from 1971 to 1973 the press
in general was treated differently by the use tax. See supra notes 86, 87 and accompanying
text; see also Parkinson, supra note 100, at 1114-26 (analyzing the portion of the Court's opin-
ion that effectively invalidated the use tax even if it applied in an even-handed manner to all
publishers).
103. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 594 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
104. Id. at 594-96; see, e.g., United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977) (com-
paring the burden of two different taxes relating to state taxation of the federal government).
105. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 597-98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 596 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The fact that the
exemption targets only a few newspapers alone is sufficient reason to invalidate the Minnesota
tax, and thus Justice White concurred in Part V of the Court's opinion and in the judgment.
Id. at 593.
107. Id. at 600 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 598.
109. Id. at 597-98. Both the majority and the dissent agreed that the application of the
general sales tax on the press would be sanctioned. Id. at 586-87 n.9, 597. The majority,
however, did not concede that Minnesota's tax was generally applicable and took exception to
Justice Rehnquist's analysis on two grounds. Id. at 590-91 n.14.
110. Id. at 600; see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
111. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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did not significantly burden the freedom of the press, it did not justify a strict
scrutiny review.' 12 Instead, the State need only show a "rational basis" for
the tax scheme." 3 The State satisfied this, according to Justice Rehnquist,
by demonstrating the impracticality of applying a sales tax on such small
business transactions given the various methods by which newspapers are
sold." '4 Justice Rehnquist also rejected the majority's second ground for
invalidating the tax in that it targeted a small group of newspapers."15 He
described the $100,000 exemption in effect as "a $4000 credit which benefits
all newspapers," and which thus could not be construed as targeting specific
publications within the press." 6
In Minneapolis Star, the Court finally developed a definite framework by
which to approach differential taxation problems involving the press.' 17 The
Minneapolis Star "test" is a two-prong analysis." 8 First, courts should scru-
tinize the tax to determine if it has a discriminatory effect on the press by
imposing a substantial burden.' Second, if a substantial burden is identi-
fied, a strict scrutiny review should then be undertaken to determine if the
state has an overriding governmental interest for imposing the differential
tax. 120
In determining whether Minnesota's special use tax imposed a substantial
burden on the press, the Court identified two types of discrimination.' 2 ' The
Court stated first that the tax was a special tax which "singled out the press"
for selective treatment, 2 2 and second that the tax targeted a select group of
newspapers. 23 Both types of discrimination were held to constitute such a
112. Id.
113. Id. at 602.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 603.
117. Id. at 582-83.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 583.
120. Id. at 582.
121. See supra notes 96, 99 and accompanying text.
122. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 582. The Court noted that even though any tax on the
press is going to impose some "burden," it will not necessarily invoke a heightened scrutiny
review unless it is a tax that singles out the press. Id. at 583. The Court's rationale is that it
has long upheld economic regulation of the press as long as the regulation was generally ap-
plied to all businesses. Id. The Court infers from this principle that, if a state then singles out
the press when applying the regulation, the state will have a heavier burden on which to justify
such an action. Id. This is the basis of the approach used in Minneapolis Star. The Court
likens the treatment to an economic regulation that singled out the press, and decides to apply
this same approach in a situation where differential taxation singles out the press. Id.
123. Id. at 591; see supra notes 88, 89 and accompanying text.
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burden on the press as to require the state to demonstrate that the burdens
were necessary to achieve overriding governmental interests.' 24
The application of the strict scrutiny standard is the second prong of the
Court's new approach as formulated in Minneapolis Star. '25 If the tax "bur-
dens" the press, for example by singling out the press for selective taxation,
then the tax will survive only if the government successfully presents an
"overriding" or "compelling" interest underlying its application of the
tax.' 26 If the State cannot meet this heavy burden, the tax will be invali-
dated as an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom of the press. 127
Justices White and Rehnquist criticized this analysis because it presumed
that a tax that singled out the press was always more burdensome and never
beneficial.' 2 The Court was reluctant to adopt the dissent's position. It
recognized that once the courts allowed differential treatment, it created the
possibility of "subsequent differentially more burdensome treatment" that
the courts would be fraught to identify and abolish.' 29 The majority also
rejected the dissent's proposition because it believed the courts were not
equipped to evaluate with precision the relative burdens of various methods
of taxation.' 30
Although Justice Rehnquist's mathematical hypothetical demonstrated
that Star Tribune would have paid more taxes under the generally applicable
sales tax than under the special use tax, '3' the Court correctly pointed out
that these calculations failed to consider the indirect economic ramifications
that affect the amount of taxes paid by a person or institution. 32 The major-
ity believed Justice Rehnquist's propositions only magnified the possibility
that the courts would make an error in their calculations when examining
the validity of the tax scheme. The Court recognized that this increased
threat of error could not be tolerated when such fundamental rights as those
guaranteed by the First Amendment were involved.
124. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 582-83.
125. Id. at 582, 586-88.
126. Id. at 588.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 596 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 596 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 588, 589 n.l1, 590 n.13 (majority opinion).
130. Id. at 589.
131. Id. at 597-98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 590-91 n.14 (majority opinion).
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D. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland:
An Addition to the Analysis
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue' 33
established that, regardless of legislative purpose, differential taxation of the
press-either by singling out the press as a whole or by targeting individual
members of the press-would not be tolerated unless the State asserted a
compelling interest to justify the burden it had placed on a specially guaran-
teed right.' 34 In Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,'35 the Court
applied this analysis to a sales tax exemption on certain magazines 136 and
held that the tax violated the Free Press Clause. 137
Under the Arkansas Gross Receipts Act (AGRA), Arkansas imposed a
four-percent sales tax on the gross receipts from the sales of all tangible per-
sonal property and certain specified services. 3 ' AGRA exempted numerous
items from the general sales tax, including newspapers 39 and certain
magazines." The magazine exemption, applying only to "religious, profes-
sional, trade and sports journals,"'' was challenged by the Arkansas Writ-
ers' Project, publisher of a general interest monthly magazine. 142 Arkansas
Writers' Project contended that its First and Fourteenth Amendment guar-
antees to freedom of the press and equal protection were violated because its
publication was subjected to the sales tax while other magazines and news-
papers were specifically exempted from the tax.' 43
The State argued that its sales tax was a "generally applicable economic
regulation."' 44 It justified exemptions to the tax because the sales tax itself
was indiscriminately imposed on the receipts from sales of all tangible per-
sonal property. 4 Nevertheless, the Court held the tax invalid under the
First Amendment because the State advanced no compelling justification for
133. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
134. Id. at 592-93.
135. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
136. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
137. Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 234.
138. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 26-52-301, 26-52-302 (Michie 1977 & Supp. 1991); see supra
note 34 and accompanying text (discussing AGRA). The section of the tax statute under
review in Arkansas Writers' is part of the same general sales tax statute (AGRA) that contains
the section under review in Leathers.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 224 (1987).
143. Id. at 225.
144. Id. at 228-29.
145. Id. at 229.
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a facially discriminatory differential tax that targeted a select group of
magazines based upon their content. 146
In pursuing the "target" criterion as set forth in Minneapolis Star, the
Arkansas Writers' Court characterized Arkansas' sales tax scheme as dis-
criminatory because it was "not evenly applied to all magazines. "147 The
Court went one step further and found another criterion on which to deem a
tax discriminatory: whether the tax classification is content-based.148 The
Arkansas tax scheme was based upon the subject-matter of the articles con-
tained within a magazine. The Court recognized that the tax did not restrict
particular views expressed within specific magazines or prevent other mem-
bers of the media from publishing similar discussions. However, the Court
relied upon precedent and rationalized that the official scrutiny required to
determine which magazines would be subject to the tax was "entirely incom-
patible" with the Free Press Clause.' 49 Once the Court established the exist-
ence of the two types of discrimination of targeting and content-based
regulation, thereby signifying that a significant burden was placed upon the
press, the Court then applied the second prong of its analysis to determine if
the State had a compelling justification for its differential treatment. 50
146. Id. at 234.
147. Id. at 229. Arkansas Writers' Project claimed to be the only publisher paying the
sales tax, while the State contended that there were actually three publishers. Id. n.4. In
either case, the Court recognized that the tax clearly burdened a very limited group of publish-
ers. Id.
148. Id. at 229-30. The foundation upon which the Court relied in determining the validity
of content-based discrimination was couched in the following cases: Regan v. Time, Inc., 468
U.S. 641 (1984) (holding unconstitutional the "purpose" requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 504(1)
that was used to determine the conditions for which the printing or publishing of any obliga-
tion or other U.S. security was allowable); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364
(1984) (striking down a ban on editorializing broadcast speech because it was based solely on
content); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (invalidating an Illinois statute that made a
content-based distinction as to which type of peaceful picketing was permitted); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (stating that content-based regula-
tions that not only restricted particular viewpoints but also prohibited public discussion of an
entire topic violated the First Amendment); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972) (holding that city ordinance prohibiting all but labor picketing within 150 feet of a
school violated the equal protection clause because it made an impermissible distinction based
on content).
149. Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 230; see League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 383;
Time, Inc., 468 U.S. at 648.
150. Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 231. The test specifically states that "[d]ifferential tax-
ation of the press.., places such a burden on the interests protected by the First Amendment
that we cannot countenance such treatment unless the State asserts a counterbalancing interest
of compelling importance that it cannot achieve without differential taxation." Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983); cf Laura V.
Farthing, Note, Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland: The Limits of Content Discrimination
Analysis, 78 GEO. L.J. 1949, 1956 (1990) (arguing that content-based regulations should be
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The State advanced three interests to support its differential taxation
scheme. First, the State argued that it had a general interest in raising reve-
nue. " ' The Court followed the reasoning of Minneapolis Star and held that
revenue raising was not a valid explanation for selective taxation because the
State could tax businesses generally. 52 Second, the State contended that it
wanted to encourage "fledgling publishers" with limited audiences.' 53 The
Court held that the exemption was not narrowly tailored to achieve that end
because the specified magazines were exempt regardless of whether they
were fledgling.' 54 Lastly, the State maintained that it aspired to "foster com-
munication" within its borders.' 55 The Court rejected this final argument
because the tax scheme only fostered communications in the areas enumer-
ated as exemptions by the statute.15
6
In holding that there was no compelling justification for the tax, the Court
acknowledged that state tax schemes could not be selectively applied to dif-
ferent members of the same medium.'57 The Court did not address whether
there was an "additional basis" for invalidating the sales tax scheme with
regard to the differential treatment between different types of periodicals.' s
It left open the issue of whether a state can differentially tax between differ-
ent members of the media, such as between newspapers and magazines. 159
The Court granted certiorari in Leathers v. Medlock 16 in order to resolve
that issue.16' Arkansas Writers' reaffirmed the two-prong analysis as a work-
able means for striking down tax schemes that unconstitutionally burdened
the press. Significantly, the Court expanded the scope of its approach to
subject to strict scrutiny only if illicit intent or targeting is present, intermediate scrutiny if
viewpoint differential effects are present, and rational basis scrutiny in the absence of any of
those three factors).
151. Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 231.
152. Id. at 231-32.
153. Id. at 232.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 234.
158. Id. at 233. Though this challenge was made in the courts below, neither the Arkansas
Chancery Court nor the Arkansas Supreme Court were required to address the issue because a
decision was reached on alternative grounds. Id. n.5; see Ragland v. Arkansas Writers' Pro-
ject, Inc., 697 S.W.2d 94 (Ark. 1985) (construing the statute to cover the Arkansas Writers'
publication because it was a publication printed within the state); Ragland v. Arkansas Writ-
ers' Project, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Ark. 1985) (holding that the sales tax was a generally
applicable regulation and thus valid under the First Amendment).
159. Arkansas Writers, 481 U.S. at 232-33.
160. 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
161. Id. at 1442.
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identifying differential taxation of the press by advancing content-based reg-
ulation as a new type of discrimination that invokes strict scrutiny review.
Justice Stevens concurred with the majority that the State failed in its
burden to justify its content-based discrimination.' 62 In resisting the Court's
traditional position regarding content-based discrimination, 163 however, Jus-
tice Stevens proffered an alternative to an intermediate scrutiny test on
which to judge such discrimination."6 Justice Scalia in his dissent, also dis-
agreed that a strict scrutiny test was necessary in this case. 165 He objected to
the majority's premise equivocating, for First Amendment purposes, the de-
nial of a tax exemption to a direct regulation.' 66 Justice Scalia argued that
unlike direct restriction, denial of participation in a tax exemption or other
162. Arkansas Writers, 481 U.S. at 235 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
163. Id. at 229-30. The majority relied on the proposition that "above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Id. at 229 (alteration removed) (quoting
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). See generally Farthing, supra note
150, at 1955 n.23.
164. Arkansas Writers" 481 U.S. at 234-35 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment). "As long as government does not wholly suppress protected speech and is com-
pletely neutral with respect to the viewpoint expressed, Justice Stevens would permit content-
based regulation of 'marginal' speech in order to protect other interests." Note, Content Regu-
lation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1860 (1983).
Justice Stevens referred to his separate opinions in a string of cases in which he proposed an
alternative to an intermediate scrutiny test. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 692 (1984)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing government can validly inquire
into purpose of currency reproduction); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 408
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing for validity of statute preventing editorializing by man-
agement of public television stations); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (arguing that universities can allocate resources on basis of content when there
is no viewpoint discrimination); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 544 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that time, place, or manner restriction may
be based on content of speech). See generally Farthing, supra note 150, at 1956 n.24 (providing
background material on two other alternatives to an intermediate scrutiny approach).
165. Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 236 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
166. Id. Justice Scalia relies upon precedent that has long recognized, even in First
Amendment contexts, that "tax exemptions, credits, and deductions are 'a form of subsidy that
is administered through the tax system,' and the general rule that 'a legislature's decision not
to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is not
subject to strict scrutiny.'" Id. (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S.
540, 544, 549 (1983)). Justice Rehnquist argued similarly in Minneapolis Star that "this Court
has never subjected governmental action to the most stringent constitutional review solely on
the basis of 'differential treatment' of particular groups." Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 598 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist asserted that because the Minnesota tax scheme's classifications did not "signifi-
cantly burden" a fundamental right under the First Amendment, the State is required to show
only that it has a rational basis for its tax scheme. Id. at 600-02.
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subsidy scheme generally has no "significant coercive effect."' 6 He con-
tended that denial of participation in a subsidy scheme does not justify a
strict scrutiny review because it does not necessarily infringe upon a funda-
mental right.' He therefore concluded that a "rational basis" review was
the appropriate standard.'6 9 Under this standard, Justice Scalia found the
Arkansas tax scheme valid because it was "reasonably related to the legiti-
mate goals" of encouraging the growth of fledgling publishers and of reduc-
ing the number of instances where tax proceeds did not cover the
administrative costs of obtaining them.
170
II. LEATHERS v MEDLOCK
Leathers v. Medlock '7 involved the constitutionality of a sales and use
tax imposed under the Arkansas Gross Receipts Act (AGRA). 172 Prior to
1987, AGRA did not subject cable television to the tax. '73 In that year the
legislature adopted Act 188, thereby extending the tax to include cable tele-
vision subscription services. 174 In response to Act 188, a cable television
subscriber, a cable television operator, and a trade organization consisting of
approximately eighty cable operators filed a class action suit in an Arkansas
chancery court. 75 The plaintiffs contended that the exclusion from the list
of services subject to the tax such as the print media and such comparable
services as scrambled broadcast television violated the First Amendment's
Free Press Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. 176
167. Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 237 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
Justice Scalia maintained that it was implausible that the generally applicable Arkansas sales
tax, together with its enumerated exemptions, was meant to inhibit any particular magazine
publication. Id.
168. Id. Justice Scalia pointed out a variety of tax preferences and subsidies based upon
subject matter-special bulk rates for certain nonprofit organizations granted by the United
States Postal Service, Kennedy Center subsidizations for only certain art genres, and govern-
ment research grant programs. Id. at 237-38. He concluded by stating that there was no
justification for distinguishing the subsidization of speech in these areas from the taxation
scheme struck down by the majority in Arkansas Writers'. Id. at 238.
169. Id. at 235-36.
170. Id.
171. 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
172. Id. at 1441. In general, AGRA imposes a 4% tax on receipts from the sales of all
tangible personal property and specified services. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 26-52-301, 26-52-302
(Michie 1987 & Supp. 1989). For the specific language of the relevants parts of AGRA, see
supra note 34 and accompanying text.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. Medlock v. Pledger, 301 Ark. 483, 484-85 (1990).
176. Id. at 485.
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The chancery court upheld the constitutionality of Act 188, concluding
that cable television was distinguishable for constitutional purposes from
other media because of its necessary use of public rights-of-way. 177 Shortly
thereafter, the Arkansas legislature adopted Act 769.17' This Act extended
the scope of the sales tax to include all television services with paying cus-
tomers, thereby bringing direct broadcast satellite television within the realm
of taxable services. 179 Notwithstanding Act 769, cable petitioners appealed
to the Arkansas Supreme Court, arguing that the sales tax continued to un-
constitutionally discriminate against cable television.'
In part one of a two-part holding, the court ruled that the tax was valid
after the passage of Act 769 and the inclusion of all related television sub-
scription services to general taxation.' The court believed, however, that
the First Amendment did prohibit selective taxation among members of
comparable media enterprises.'8 2 Finding that the evidence supported the
contention that cable television and direct broadcast satellite services were
primarily the same,18 3 the court held in the second part of its decision that
the sales tax was unconstitutional during the period when cable services
alone were subject to the tax.' 84 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 8 5 to
define the degree of allowable differential taxation on the press.'8 6
A. The Majority
Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion in a three-part ruling that
further delineated the scope of the nondiscrimination principle with regard
177. Id.
178. Id. at 484.
179. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
180. Medlock, 301 Ark. at 485. Petitioners challenged Act 188 as a violation of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press, the right to equal privileges and immunities, and the right to
equal protection under the law. Id.
181. Id. at 487. After Act 769 was enacted, both cable and satellite services were subjected
to the sales tax. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The constitutionality of Act 769
was not before the court in this case. Id. Therefore, the court declined to invalidate Act 769
on the grounds that it discriminated between members of different media by exempting news-
papers and magazines from the sales tax and not cable and satellite services. Id. The court
stated that it was "unwilling to hold that all mass communications media must be taxed in the
same way.. It would be impossible to impose a tax which would have the same effect on broad-
cast television, the delivery of which produces no direct 'gross proceeds,' and cable television."
Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. This evidence included similarities in both the cost of the two services and the
mode of dissemination of information via decoders for unscrambling broadcasts. Id.
184. Id. Thus, the court invalidated Act 188 which extended the sales tax to cable services
alone. Id.
185. Pledger v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
186. Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1442 (1991).
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to differential taxation when entangled with the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of the press. First, the Court reversed the state supreme court's
decision that the Arkansas sales tax was unconstitutional when it was ap-
plied only to cable television services.1" 7 The Court then affirmed that the
sales tax did not violate the Free Press Clause when applied to both cable
and satellite television subscription services.'"" Finally, the Court remanded
the equal protection question in order to have the parties develop arguments
on the constitutionality of the state's temporary tax distinction between re-
lated television broadcast services.
18 9
1. Tax on the Press Upheld
The Leathers Court began its examination' 90 by employing the two-prong
analysis developed in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commis-
sioner of Revenue 91 and amplified in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland.'92 The first prong of the analysis considers whether the statute is
substantially discriminatory.' 93 This step consists of identifying such types
of discrimination as illicit legislative intent, special taxation, targeting, and
content-based regulation.' 94 Once discrimination is judged to exist, the sec-
ond prong of the test is applied to consider whether there is a compelling
governmental interest in the state's differential tax scheme. 195
To determine if there was significant discrimination, the Leathers Court
first concluded that the tax scheme was not a "special" one designed to "sin-
gle out the press."' 196 It reasoned that the Arkansas sales tax was a tax of
"general applicability" because it applied to the sale of all tangible personal
property as well as a broad range of services. 9' Unlike the tax invalidated
in Minneapolis Star, the Arkansas sales tax was not a special tax directed
187. Id. at 1447.
188. Id. In this part of the holding the Court also concluded that the tax was constitu-
tional even when not imposed upon different members of the press such as newspapers and
magazines. Id.
189. Medlock v. Pledger, 305 Ark. 610 (1991), supp. op. Medlock v. Pledger, 306 Ark. 178
(1991); see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
190. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1443-47.
191. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
192. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
193. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444-45.
194. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
195. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 582.
196. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444. "Singling out the press" as an indication of discrimina-
tion was first identified in Minneapolis Star. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 581-85.
197. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444. The Court reiterated its position that the press could be
validly subjected to a generally applicable tax without offending its freedoms under the First
Amendment. Id.; see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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solely at the press. 198 The Court found, therefore, that the tax was not dis-
criminatory on this basis.' 99
The second consideration involved ascertaining whether the tax scheme
"targeted" a small group of speakers. 2" The Court, basing its decision pri-
marily on two factors, found no evidence of discrimination by targeting.20'
The Court initially found no indication of illicit censorial motive on the part
of the Arkansas state legislature to deliberately burden a narrow group of
speakers by the tax.2 °2 Unlike the license tax in Grosean, the Arkansas tax
was not intentionally structured to function as a "penalty" on the free press
rights of a few.2"3
The Court then distinguished the "target" effect of the tax scheme in Ar-
kansas Writers' from the facts at issue in Leathers. While the tax scheme in
Arkansas Writers' burdened at most three magazines, 2" the sales tax in
Leathers applied uniformly to each of the approximately 100 cable
franchises within Arkansas.2"5 The Court acknowledged that a tax targeting
a small number of speakers ran the risk of endangering only a limited range
of views.2°6 Therefore, in Arkansas Writers', the tax was invalidated because
it was structured to encumber only a limited range of views from a select
group of magazines subject to the tax. The Leathers Court, however, con-
cluded that the Arkansas sales tax affected a large number of cable opera-
tors. 20 7 It reasoned that those operators offered the public a wide range of
views throughout the state via its programming.20 8
198. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 581.
199. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444.
200. Id. at 1444-45. The license tax in Grosjean fell primarily upon 13 publications out of
137 daily and weekly newspapers published in the state of Louisiana. Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 240-41 (1936). The use tax in Minneapolis Star substantially bur-
dened only two newspaper publishers of approximately 375 paid circulation newspapers in
Minnesota. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 591 & n.15; see Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 314 N.W.2d 201, 203-204 & nn.4, 5 (Minn. 1981). The Ar-
kansas sales tax in Arkansas Writers' also targeted a limited group of magazine publishers.
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 n.4 (1987).
201. Leathers, IIl S. Ct. at 1444-45.
202. Id. at 1444.
203. See supra notes 69, 74 and accompanying text.
204. Arkansas Writers, 481 U.S. at 229 & n.4.
205. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1445.
206. Id. at 1444. The Court compared this risk to that of content-based regulation, con-
cluding that both would "distort the market for ideas." Id.
207. Id. at 1445. Under Act 188, approximately 100 cable operators were subjected to the
state sales tax scheme. Id. at 1444. At that time, only seven satellite broadcast services were
available in Arkansas, none of which were taxed until Act 769 became effective. Id.; see supra
note 34 and accompanying text.
208. Id. at 1445.
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Furthermore, the Court was unmoved by the Arkansas Supreme Court's
finding that cable and satellite television services were essentially the same
medium.2 °" The Court concluded that even if it accepted the determination
that satellite television services were the same medium as cable, the Arkan-
sas tax structure still did not penalize a narrow group of speakers or ideas.21 °
Consequently, the Court did not find the Arkansas tax scheme discrimina-
tory on the basis of targeting, despite the fact that the tax did not apply
evenly to all the members within a similar medium.2 1'
The Court's third consideration in determining the existence of discrimi-
nation was whether the Arkansas tax was content-based prejudiced.21 2
First, the Court examined the specific language of the relevant statutory pro-
visions and found that the content of the services provided by cable televi-
sion was not a determinative factor in its being subjected to the general sales
tax. 2 13 Second, the record contained no evidence showing that the variety of
programming offered by cable services differed materially "in its message"
from that of other informational institutions such as newspapers, magazines,
or direct broadcast satellite services.2 14 Therefore, given that the tax scheme
did not differentiate among enterprises subject to the tax on the basis of con-
tent, the Court concluded that it was not discriminatory.21 5
The Leathers Court found that the Arkansas tax scheme withstood the
first prong of its analysis. Specifically, the Court did not detect a substantial
discriminatory burden on the press on any of the following grounds: special
taxation applicable to the press alone, illicit legislative censorial intent,
targeting of a small group of speakers, and content-based regulation.21 6 As a
result, because the Court did not find proof of a substantial burden imposed
upon the press, it was not required to address the second prong of the test
(i.e., to determine whether there was a compelling governmental interest for
the general burden of the Arkansas sales tax on the press).2 17
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. For an analysis arguing for limitations on the application of the strict scrutiny
standard to content-based classifications, see Farthing, supra note 150, at 1955 n.23.
213. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1445.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Contra Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 582 (1983) (requiring strict scrutiny review because two types of discrimination were
identified); Arkansas Writers' Project Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987) (same).
19921
Catholic University Law Review
2. The "Additional Basis" Analysis
The two-prong analysis as employed by the Court thus far has identified
unconstitutional tax treatment among members of the same medium. 1 8
The Court's result after applying that analysis in Leathers was two-fold.
First, the Court upheld the Arkansas sales tax when it was applied only to
cable television services.219 Moreover, even if satellite broadcast services
were found to be the same medium as cable, the Court held that the Arkan-
sas sales tax was still valid when applied to cable services alone.220 The two-
prong analysis was not, however, equipped to resolve whether a tax scheme
could discriminate between different members of the press. 22' In response to
this deficiency, the Leathers Court expanded its analysis by determining
whether there was an "additional basis" for striking down tax legislation
that differentiated between different members of the press.222
The cable petitioners claimed that an additional basis for nullifying the
legislation was the intermedia and intramedia discrimination imposed by the
Arkansas tax scheme, which exempted the similar medium of satellite broad-
cast television and the different media of newspapers and magazines.22 3 Pe-
titioners argued that there was an additional basis in these discriminations
regardless of whether the Court found any evidence of intent to suppress
speech or particular ideas.2 24 The Leathers Court dismissed that argument,
holding instead that distinguishing between types of media for tax purposes
is not an additional basis for striking down a tax scheme unless it "is di-
rected at, or presents the danger of suppressing, particular ideas. '225
218. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
219. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1445.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. The "additional basis" concept was initially introduced as a possible means for
invalidating the sales tax scheme in Arkansas Writers' because of the distinction made between
two different members of the press-newspapers and magazines. Arkansas Writers' Project,
Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 233 (1987). However, the Arkansas Writers' Court invalidated
that tax scheme by applying the standard two-prong test from Minneapolis Star, and thus the
issue remained whether this "additional basis," or distinction between different types of media,
was a valid means by which to strike down a tax as violative of the First Amendment. Id.
Leathers provided the Court with an opportunity to resolve whether a state is forbidden
under the Free Press Clause to impose a generally applicable sales tax on only selected seg-
ments of the media. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1442. Because the Court did not find any of the
types of discrimination which would invalidate differential tax schemes under the two-prong
analysis, it determined that "cable petitioners can prevail only if the Arkansas tax scheme
presents 'an additional basis' for concluding that the State has violated petitioners First
Amendment rights." Id. at 1445.
223. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1445.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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The Court supported its conclusion by relying on the general principle
that legislatures are not required to subsidize First Amendment rights
through special deductions or exemptions.2 2 6 The Court recognized the
broad latitude that legislatures have customarily been granted in creating
classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.227 Thus, the Court refused to
find a particular tax scheme constitutionally suspect under the First Amend-
ment simply because the tax scheme did not exempt all speech or exempted
only some speech from a generally applicable tax.22' The Court maintained
that there must be some "explicit demonstration" that a classification is a
"hostile and oppressive discrimination" aimed at specific persons or ideas in
order for the First Amendment to be implicated.229
The Leathers Court determined under its additional basis analysis that the
Arkansas sales tax scheme did not present the danger of suppressing particu-
lar ideas.23 ° It held that the tax scheme constituted a permissible act by the
legislature to exempt certain media from a generally applicable tax.23 ' The
Court decided that there was no "additional basis" for striking down the
226. Id. at 1445; see Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (upholding the
Internal Revenue Code's disallowance of a tax deduction on monies expended to promote or
defeat pending legislation); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (up-
holding the Internal Revenue Code's distinction for tax deduction purposes between nonprofit
organizations engaged in lobbying activities and those that are not).
227. Leathers, Ill S. Ct. at 1446 (citing Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 547); see
also Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940) (placing a heavy burden on parties chal-
lenging tax statutes because the courts traditionally allow for broad discretion due to the legis-
lature's familiarity with local concerns).
228. See Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513; Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 545-46.
229. Leathers, Ill S. Ct. at 1446 (citing Madden, 309 U.S. at 87-88). First, the Leathers
Court reasoned that, absent discrimination aimed at particular ideas, the Madden-Camma-
rano-Taxation with Representation line of cases established a standard that favored duly en-
acted tax schemes even if they differentially taxed speakers. Id. at 1445-46.
This same standard was recognized in a similar line of cases which involved government
economic regulations affecting the press as opposed to taxation. See Mabee v. White Plains
Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186
(1946). In each of those cases, the Supreme Court held that the exemption of certain small
newspapers from the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was constitutional
and therefore did not unduly burden the papers' First Amendment rights. Mabee, 327 U.S. at
184; Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 192-94. The Court reasoned that the exempting of small
newspapers from a regulation that applied generally to all businesses was not singling out
members of the press for special treatment or deliberately penalizing a certain group of news-
papers. Mabee, 327 U.S. at 184; Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 194.
Taken together, the Court concluded that these two lines of cases established that speakers,
including members of the press, could be differentially taxed unless the tax scheme threatened
the suppression of particular ideas. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1447.
230. Id. The Court found no evidence that the tax would stifle the free exchange of ideas
or censor the expressive activities of cable television. Id.
231. Id.
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Arkansas tax scheme as it applied to the press.2 32 The Court concluded that
under both the traditional two-prong analysis and the new additional basis
analysis, the First Amendment was not violated by Arkansas' extension of
its generally applicable sales tax to only cable services, or to both cable and
satellite services, while exempting the print media.2 33
B. The Dissent's Reproach
The dissent in Leathers perceived the majority's outcome as a narrowing
of the principles developed in prior differential taxation cases.23 4 Led by
Justice Marshall, the dissent condemned the Arkansas sales tax scheme for
differentially discriminating among members of the media.235 Justice Mar-
shall analyzed three factors in reaching his conclusion. First, he accentuated
the extensive and unrebutted proof that consumers regarded the services
provided by cable television as generally interchangeable with those services
provided by other members of the media. 236 Thus, by only taxing cable serv-
ices, the tax scheme inflicted a competitive disadvantage upon cable which
triggered the "risk of covert censorship. '237 Justice Marshall asserted that it
was the risk of censorship which required the State to meet a heavy burden
in order to justify its differential treatment by some "compelling governmen-
tal interest. '23' Though the majority did not apply this strict scrutiny stan-
dard because it found the tax scheme even-handed, Justice Marshall's
analysis would necessitate this showing for the tax to be upheld.239 Accord-
ing to Justice Marshall, the State failed in this undertaking because the only
interest raised by the State was its desire to increase revenues, and the Court
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1448 (Marshall, J., dissenting, in which Blackmun, J., joined).
235. Id. at 1448-49. Specifically, the dissent stated that "under Arkansas' general sales tax
scheme, cable operators pay a sales tax on their subscription fees that is not paid by newspaper
or magazine companies on their subscription fees or by television or radio broadcasters on
their advertising revenues." Id.
236. Id. at 1449.
237. Id. It is that risk, Justice Marshall contended, that underlied the main cases cited by
the majority and found by them to be uncontrolling. Id. Unlike the tax in Grosjean, where
there was clear legislative intent to censor newspapers, Justice Marshall maintained that the
Leathers tax scheme was more akin to the tax in Minneapolis Star, in which there was no
evidence of explicit censorial motive on the part of the legislature. See Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591-92 (1983). Under those
circumstances, the Court then turned its attention to the fact that Minnesota's power to single
out the press presented such a "potential for abuse" that it could not be justified by any interest
the State put forth. Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
238. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1450 (citing Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585).
239. Id.
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has traditionally held this to be an insufficient justification for overcoming
the strict scrutiny standard. 2"°
The dissent's second contention was that the majority's approach to the
"targeting" issue was an "overly simplistic" and "unresponsive" misapplica-
tion of an analysis that the Court had employed in similar situations in the
past to reach contrary holdings.241 Justice Marshall refuted the majority's
claim that because 100 cable operators were subjected to the tax instead of
only a "few," ' 242 there was a diminished chance of adversely affecting a lim-
ited range of views. 243 He contended that the majority's new restrictive
reading of this test provided no meaningful guidance as to what will consti-
tute a sufficiently large group. 2 " Justice Marshall argued that the majority's
"small versus large" analysis was founded on a mistaken belief that a large
group intrinsically offered such a wide range of programming that there was
no inherent risk of the tax affecting only a limited range of views. 245 To
support this contention, Justice Marshall referred to evidence in the record
that most communities were serviced by only one cable operator, and that
many cable operators offered unique programming contributions to their
customers.24 6 Justice Marshall concluded there was ample possibility for a
limited range of ideas to be unconstitutionally stifled by the Arkansas tax
scheme.247
Finally, Justice Marshall claimed that the majority had misinterpreted the
precedent it relied upon in its "additional basis" analysis.24 ' Those cases,
Justice Marshall argued, involved infringements upon the freedom of speech
240. Id.; see Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231-32 (1987) (hold-
ing that neither the State's general interests in raising revenues, encouraging "fledgling" pub-
lishers, nor fostering communication within its borders could overcome the burden necessary
to validate its tax exemption for certain magazines). This same interest in raising revenue was
proffered in Minneapolis Star, where the Court stated that
[s]tanding alone ... [the interest in raising revenue] cannot justify the special treat-
ment of the press, for an alternative means of achieving the same interest without
raising concerns under the First Amendment is clearly available: the State could raise
the revenue by taxing businesses generally, avoiding the censorial threat implicit in a
tax that singles out the press.
Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 586 (footnotes omitted).
241. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1451. Under the "target" analysis, developed by the Court in
Grosjean, Minneapolis Star, and Arkansas Writers', a generally applicable tax on nonmedia
enterprises offends the First Amendment when applied to the media if it burdens only a small
group within the press. Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 229.
242. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
243. Leathers, Il1 S. Ct. at 1451.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1451-52.
247. Id. at 1452.
248. Id. at 1452-53.
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generally, and thus should not have been so heavily relied upon in a case
involving freedom of the press.249 Instead, Justice Marshall endorsed the
notion that the government has a special obligation to protect the press from
discrimination. 25 ° This obligation includes striking down all forms of differ-
ential taxation to "avoid disrupting the integrity of the information mar-
ket.",211 Justice Marshall concluded that differential taxation of the press
violated the government's obligation of evenhandedness by interfering with a
citizen's freedom to choose his preferred information format.25 2
III. DIFFERENTIAL TAXATION AND THE PRESS: THE SCOPE DELIMITED
Leathers v. Medlock has significantly impacted the law on differential tax-
ation and the press. The Supreme Court effectively narrowed the scope of
when it will strike down a particular tax scheme as violative of the Free
Press Clause. The Leathers Court tailored the means by which to uphold
impartial tax legislation as applied to the press. In doing so, the Court has
not diminished the principles established by precedent. 2 3 The Court's two-
prong analysis remains the definitive test by which to identify unconstitu-
tional tax regimes on the press.2 54
After Leathers, it is still impermissible under the two-prong analysis to tax
the press by means not generally accorded nonmedia businesses.255 A spe-
cial tax engineered to apply solely to members of the press will not survive
249. Id. at 1453. Justice Marshall contended that Taxation with Representation stands for
the principle that the Free Speech Clause is not violated if the government "selectively subsi-
dizes one group of speakers according to content-neutral criteria." Id. at 1453. In contrast, he
maintained that the Free Press Clause guaranteed members of the press protection from dis-
crimination. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. Justice Marshall based this obligation on the Framers' specific intent "to preserve
an untrammeled press as a vital source of public information." Id. (quoting Grosjean v. Amer-
ican Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)).
252. Id. at 1453.
253. It remains unconstitutional to impose tax schemes on members of the press by means
that have led the Court to strike down differential taxation in the past-illicit legislative intent,
"special" taxes, targeting, or content-based classifications-unless there is a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. See id. at 1443, 1445. It also remains clear that a generally applicable tax
imposed upon the press does not infringe upon First Amendment guarantees. Id. at 1444.
254. Id. at 1443-44.
255. Id. at 1443. The Arkansas sales and use tax applies to a broad range of nonmedia
services, including utility, communication, lodging, maintenance, printing, and ticket distribu-
tion. ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-301 (Michie Supp. 1989); see Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Comm'r of Revenue, 571 N.E.2d 617 (Mass. 1991) (applying the two-prong analysis to invali-
date a sales tax scheme which subjected newspaper publishers to different tax treatment than
other manufacturers).
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under the First Amendment absent a compelling governmental interest.25 6
Likewise, the two-prong analysis prevails as a viable test for determining the
constitutionality of differential taxation upon individual members of the
same medium. Thus, if the Court encounters sufficient evidence of discrimi-
nation among members of the same medium, the tax scheme will be struck
down absent a compelling government interest.25 7
Prior to Leathers, the Court only utilized its two-prong analysis in tax
schemes which applied differently to members within the same medium.
258
One of the novel problems posed in Leathers was that the tax scheme was
not evenly applied to members of similar media-cable and satellite televi-
sion. 259 The Leathers Court responded by holding that, under the two-
prong analysis, the Arkansas sales tax did not discriminate among members
of similar media.2 ' The Court reasoned that, regardless of whether it ac-
cepted the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision that cable and satellite televi-
sion were the same medium, its analysis and results under the two-prong test
would not change.26 1 In effect, the Court has held that members of the same
or similar media can be taxed differently without violating the Free Press
Clause.
This result provides meaningful insight into the two-prong analysis as a
test developed to strike down discriminatory tax schemes within a single
medium of the press. The two-prong analysis was designed to guarantee
individual members of the press freedom from infringement of their First
Amendment rights by invalidating discriminatory tax legislation. It was not
developed to "equalize" tax treatment of the press in the sense that each
member of a particular medium be treated in exactly the same manner in
order to satisfy government obligations under the First Amendment.2 62 The
256. Leathers, III S. Ct. at 1444. The Minneapolis Star Court was the first to identify
"special" taxes on the press as a type of discrimination impermissible under the Free Press
Clause. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591
(1983).
257. Leathers, I11 S. Ct. at 1443, 1445.
258. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
259. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444-45. Until Act 769 was enacted, 100 cable service opera-
tors were subjected to the Arkansas sales tax while seven scrambled satellite broadcast services
were not. Id. at 1444. The Arkansas Supreme Court accepted the proffered evidence that
cable and satellite services were the same medium. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
260. Leathers I I1 S. Ct. at 1445.
261. Id.
262. Previous differential tax regimes were struck down by the Court because of the dis-
criminatory "means" by which they were imposed upon the press-illicit legislative intent,
"special" taxes, targeting, or content-based classifications-and not because the "end" result
was unequal taxation among members of the group. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 251 (1936) (stating that it is the "form in which the tax is imposed" that raises First
Amendment concerns); see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of
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Leathers Court maintained that members within the same medium or similar
media can be taxed unequally as long as the tax scheme survives the two-
prong analysis.
263
The second significant impact of the Leathers holding was the develop-
ment of the "additional basis" test. Under this separate analysis, the Court
held that taxing differently within a single medium or among different media
was not, in and of itself, evidence of discrimination. 2" The Supreme Court
narrowed the nondiscrimination principle by declining to recognize gener-
ally disparate tax treatment among members of the press as prima facie evi-
dence of unconstitutional discrimination.
The Court realized its primary objective by these results-it maintained
the equilibrium between the press' guaranteed protections under the First
Amendment from unconstitutional infringements and the state's power to
tax the press. First, the Court followed precedent by remaining focused
upon the identification of definitive types of discrimination.2 6 The Court
remained steadfast in its belief that a tax scheme on the press is constitution-
ally suspect and subject to a strict scrutiny review only upon identification of
one of the four conclusive types of discrimination. Second, the Court en-
hanced a state's power to tax the press by specifically tailoring the nondis-
crimination principle to combat the problem of overinclusiveness in its
determination of unconstitutional tax schemes. The Leathers Court accom-
plished this by applying judicially-accepted tax principles to situations in-
volving the press that allow for broad latitude in a state's power to create
distinctions in tax legislation.2 66 Thus, a state need not fear First Amend-
ment repercussions from unequal tax treatment both among and between
members of the press.
Leathers exemplifies the type of case that will arise in the future. In past
differential taxation cases, the Court's two-prong analysis resulted in the
identification of several types of discrimination in each case.267 Three of
these types of discrimination-illicit legislative intent, special "singling out"
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983) (recognizing that it is the very act of selecting the press for
special treatment or tailoring a tax to single out a few members of the press that warrants a
strict scrutiny review to protect First Amendment guarantees); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc.
v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987) (stating that it is the "content-based approach to taxa-
tion" that invokes the strict scrutiny review).
263. Leathers, 11 S. Ct. at 1445.
264. Id. at 1447. This reiterated the result under the two-prong analysis that members of
the same or similar media are not entitled to identical tax treatment under the First Amend-
ment. Id.
265. Id. at 1444-45.
266. Id. at 1446.
267. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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taxes, and content-based regulation-are more explicit and thus easier to
recognize in a particular tax scheme. The fourth, that of targeting, is a more
precarious type of discrimination which is not so easily identifiable. Leathers
presented a tax scheme that was clearly generally applicable, void of illicit
legislative intent and free of content-based discrimination. 268 The Court
therefore relied heavily upon identifying discrimination on the sole basis of
targeting, the most difficult type of discrimination to delineate.2 69 While the
Leathers Court correctly drew the conclusion that there was no targeting of
a few members of the press in the Arkansas sales tax scheme,27° future cases
relying solely upon this basis may be more questionable.
Justice Marshall's dissent centered upon this predicament, charging that
the majority's approach to targeting amounted to nothing more than a mere
numbers game.27' This allegation found little support in the majority's opin-
ion. Barring the discovery of another type of discrimination, courts may be
asked in future cases to judge the constitutionality of a tax scheme solely
upon whether it targets a select few members of the press. This analysis,
however, is not the simple numbers game Justice Marshall interprets it to be.
Though the size of the group of affected media members has been a major
consideration when identifying targeting, 272 the Court has also considered
whether the tax resembled a "penalty for a few" as well as the breadth of
information offered by the affected group. 273 In its analysis of targeting, the
majority was therefore making a much broader evaluation than that alleged
by Justice Marshall.
Justice Marshall's alternative proposal would find discriminatory target-
ing whenever there is evidence of an uneven application among individuals
of a particular medium.2 74 This oversimplified approach to targeting would
be overinclusive in its identification of discrimination, and it would lead to
the striking down of any tax scheme regardless of the number of affected
actors. The majority has taken a bold step by recognizing that within the
spectrum of "targeting" there are reliable means by which to classify some
unevenly applied tax schemes as nondiscriminatory.
The Leathers Court's holding allowing the imposition of a state sales tax
on only selected segments of the media was a victory for Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice Scalia. Each vigorously dissented in past differential taxa-
268. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444-45.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1451 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 1445.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1452, 1453 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tion decisions because the majority disregarded the principle that
exemptions from government subsidies or benefits did not generally infringe
upon fundamental rights."' Prior to Leathers, however, the Court was not
invalidating tax schemes because of the disparate treatment in the granting
of particular exemptions to certain members of the press. The Court was
instead striking down differential tax legislation because it significantly bur-
dened a small group within the press, thus potentially threatening the sup-
pression of a particular viewpoint or idea." 6
Leathers did not present the types of repressive discrimination that belea-
guered the freedom of the press in past cases. 27 The Court therefore incor-
porated expansive tax policies into its analysis of differential taxation of the
press. Most notably, these policies included allowing for broad latitude in
the creation of classifications in tax statutes and recognizing that the First
Amendment is not implicated unless the statute presents the danger of sup-
pressing particular ideas."18 The Leathers decision perpetuates a dual pol-
icy. First, it rigorously protects First Amendment guarantees by striking
down onerous types of discrimination in tax schemes within the same me-
dium. Simultaneously, it fosters broad government benefit allocation princi-
275. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
600 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing Minnesota's tax scheme was constitutional be-
cause the State's use of tax classifications did not significantly burden a fundamental right);
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 236 (1987) (Scalia, J, dissenting,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (arguing Arkansas' tax scheme was constitutional because the tax
distinctions did not infringe upon the exercise of a fundamental right); see also Gary A. Win-
ters, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions as "Nonsubsidies" When Is Deference Inappropriate?,
80 GEO. L.J. 131 (1991) (arguing that a broad portion of governmental speech-related subsi-
dies do not violate the First Amendment because private funding alternatives are available).
276. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
277. See id.
278. Leathers, I I S. Ct. at 1446. The Court stated that "[L]egislatures have especially
broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes," and quoted from an
earlier case involving the constitutionality of tax legislation: "Since the members of a legisla-
ture necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot have, the
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that
a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and
classes." Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) (quoting Madden
v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87 (1940)).
Since Leathers was handed down, lower courts have applied the Court's "additional basis"
rationale to uphold expansive tax schemes that differentially treat dissimilar members of the
press. See Maryland Pennysaver Group, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 594 A.2d 1142
(Md. 1991) (upholding state sales tax that applied to pennysavers while exempting newspapers
because it did not threaten to censor particular ideas or viewpoints); Sacramento Cable Televi-
sion v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 3d 232 (1991) (upholding utility users tax on the use
of cable television and other common utility services because there was no evidence of intent to
suppress ideas).
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pies by upholding generally applicable tax schemes that appropriate
exemptions in a disparate manner between different media.
IV. CONCLUSION
The government's capacity to tax differentially gives it a powerful weapon
against the taxpayer. This issue becomes even more acute when that tax-
payer is a member of the press and has specially guaranteed rights protected
under the First Amendment. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's ruling in
Leathers v. Medlock makes it clear that the press can be taxed differentially
without abridging its freedom of the press. The Court remains dedicated,
however, to imposing a rigorous scrutiny of any tax scheme that may en-
croach upon that right. The Court's two-prong analysis has evolved into a
comprehensive test designed to identify specific types of discrimination and
to subject them to a strict scrutiny review in order to ultimately determine
the constitutionality of a challenged tax scheme. Furthermore, under the
Court's new additional basis analysis, legislatures now possess the where-
withal to tax different media enterprises on the most equitable and efficient
grounds possible according to individual characteristics of each institution.
Leathers v. Medlock has effectively delimited the scope of differential taxa-
tion without adversely infringing upon the freedom of the press.
Gregory S. Asciolla
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